

Philosophy of Logic and Language
Conditionals

Primary Readings

- (!) Stalnaker, R., 'A Theory of Conditionals', in Cornman, J., W. (ed.) *Studies in Logical Theory*, Blackwell (1968), pp. 98-112. (Reprinted in Jackson (ed.), *Conditionals*, OUP, (1991)).
- (!) Jackson, F., 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals', *Philosophical Review* 88 (1979), pp. 565-589.
- (!) Edgington, D., 'Conditionals', *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*.
- Edgington, D., 'On Conditionals', *Mind* 104 (1995), pp. 235-329.
- Lewis, D., *Counterfactuals*, Blackwell (1973), **ch.1**.
- Grice, P., *Studies in the Ways of Words*, Harvard University Press (1989), pp. 58-85.
- Bennet, J., *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals*, OUP (2003).
- Dudman, V.H., 'On Conditionals', *Journal of Philosophy* 91 (1994), pp. 113-128.

Background Readings:

- Sainsbury, M., *Logical Forms*, (2nd edn), Blackwell, (2001), Ch. 2, §4.4-§8; Ch. 3; and Ch. 5, §2.

Questions:

Do conditionals have truth conditions? If so, what are they? If not, how can they nonetheless be meaningful?